Abstract. This paper presents an efficient interpolation attack using a computer algebra system. The interpolation attack proposed by Jakobsen and Knudsen was shown to be effective for attacking ciphers that use simple algebraic functions. However, there was a problem that the complexity and the number of pairs of plaintexts and ciphertexts required for the attack can be overestimated. We solve this problem by first, finding the actual number of coefficients in the polynomial (or rational expression) used in the attack by using a computer algebra system, and second, by finding the polynomial (or rational expression) with fewest coefficients by choosing the plaintexts. We apply this interpolation attack to the block cipher SNAKE proposed by Lee and Cha at JW-ISC'97. In the SNAKE family there are two types of Feistel ciphers, SNAKE(1) and SNAKE(2), with different round functions. Both of them use the inverse function in Galois Field GF(2 m ) as S-box. We show that when the block size is 64 bits and m = 8, all round keys are recovered for SNAKE(1) and SNAKE(2) with up to 11 rounds. Moreover, when the block size is 128 bits and m = 16, all round keys are recovered for SNAKE(1) with up to 15 rounds and SNAKE(2) with up to 16 rounds.
Introduction
Since two powerful cryptanalyses on block ciphers, differential cryptanalysis [1] and linear cryptanalysis [6] , were presented, some new block ciphers with provable security against these cryptanalyses have been proposed. On the other hand, Jakobsen and Knudsen raised the alarm that some of them are easy to cryptanalyze by algebraic attacks such as higher order differential attack and interpolation attack [3] . These attacks are effective for attacking ciphers that use simple algebraic functions. For example, there is the 6-round prototype Feistel cipher presented in [8] , called the cipher KN . It uses the cubing function in Most part of this work was done while the authors were with TAO, or Telecommunications Advancement Organization of Japan.
GF (2 33 ) in the round function, and was broken by the higher order differential attack exploiting the low degree of polynomial expression over GF (2) . A variant of the cipher, called the cipher PURE, which uses the cubing function in GF (2 32 ) as the round function, was broken by the interpolation attack up to 32 rounds by exploiting the low degree of polynomial expression over GF (2 32 ). Moreover, a slightly modified version of the cipher SHARK [9] , which uses the inverse function in GF (2 8 ) as S-box, was broken up to 5 rounds by an interpolation attack exploiting the low degree of rational expression over GF (2 8 ).
The principle of the interpolation attack is that, roughly speaking, if the ciphertext is represented as a polynomial or rational expression of the plaintext with N coefficients, the polynomial or rational expression can be constructed using N pairs of plaintexts and ciphertexts. Since N determines the complexity and the number of pairs required for the attack, it is important to find as small N as possible.
This paper shows two solutions to find a tighter upper bound of N . The first problem is that generally it is difficult to find the actual number of coefficients in the polynomial or rational expression. In [3] Jakobsen and Knudsen estimated it from the degree of the polynomial or rational expression. However, this method often overestimates it when we use a multivariate polynomial or rational expression, in particular. As the solution to this problem, we compute the actual polynomial or rational expression by using a computer algebra system and find the number of coefficients. The second problem is the number of coefficients (or the degree) of the polynomial or rational expression varies with the plaintexts chosen. If we use a computer algebra system, it is easy to compute the number of coefficients of the polynomial or rational expression in a few variables. We can find the polynomial or rational expression with the fewest coefficients by choosing the plaintexts.
We apply this interpolation attack to the block cipher SNAKE proposed by Lee and Cha at JW-ISC'97 [5] . This cipher is not a prototype cipher and we don't modify it to simplify the cryptanalysis. The cipher SNAKE is a Feistel cipher with provable resistance against differential and linear cryptanalysis. In [5] , it is also claimed that SNAKE is resistant against higher order differential attack and interpolation attack, though the rationale was not discussed enough. SNAKE(1) and SNAKE(2) have different round functions. To put it concretely, the structure of the round function is the same, the substitution-permutation network (SPN). Both of them use the same number of S-boxes in the round function, the function used as the S-box is the same, e.g., the inverse function in GF(2 m ), but only the diffusion layer is different.
We apply to the cipher SNAKE the interpolation attack using rational expressions. If we represent the cipher SNAKE as a polynomial, the attack becomes impractical with only a few rounds, since the number of coefficients in the polynomial increases to the upper bound of the number of pairs we can obtain. This is because the degree of the inverse function in GF(2 m ) in polynomial expression is very high as follows:
Using a computer algebra system, we find the rational expression with the fewest coefficients by choosing the plaintexts. As a result, both of the SNAKE ciphers with many rounds are broken. When the block size is 64 bit and m = 8, all round keys are recovered for SNAKE (1) and SNAKE(2) with up to 11 rounds. Moreover, when the block size is 128 bit and m = 16, all round keys are recovered for SNAKE(1) with up to 15 rounds and SNAKE(2) with up to 16 rounds. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give a summary of the interpolation attack. Section 3 describes the specifications of the cipher SNAKE. In Sections 4 and 5, we apply the interpolation attack to the cipher SNAKE with blocksize 64 bits and 128 bits, respectively. In Section 6, we discuss some problems and make concluding remarks.
The Interpolation Attack
In this section, we describe the outline of the interpolation attack proposed by Jakobsen and Knudsen in [3] and explain the notations used in this paper. The target of the attack is an iterated cipher with block size 2n bits and R rounds. We denote a plaintext by x and a ciphertext by y. Let x be the concatenation of u subblocks x i ∈ GF(2 m ), where 2n = m × u. We define y similarly.
Moreover, we denote the i-th round key by k (i) and let the length of k (i) be l bits. Similarly let k (i) be the concatenation of t subblocks k
Global Deduction
If the key is fixed to k, a ciphertext subblock y j ∈ GF(2 m ) can be expressed as a polynomial in plaintext subblocks {x u , x u−1 , . . . , x 1 } as follows: [4, 3] . Similarly, by swapping ciphertexts and plaintexts, once the attacker can construct
, (s)he can decrypt any ciphertext into the corresponding plaintext for key k, without knowing the key.
Instance Deduction
If some subblocks of plaintexts are fixed to some values as e.g., x = (0, . . . , 0, x 1 ), a ciphertext subblock y j ∈ GF(2 m ) can be expressed as a polynomial as follows:
In this case, f jk (x 1 ) is a polynomial in one variable x 1 . Generally, there are fewer coefficients in f jk (x 1 ) than in global deduction. Therefore, the attacker can construct f jk (x 1 ) from fewer chosen plaintexts and ciphertexts. Let N be the number of coefficient and let deg x1 f jk = d, and N is estimated as N ≤ d + 1. Once the attacker can construct f jk (x 1 ) from N pairs of plaintexts and ciphertexts, (s)he can encrypt a subset of all plaintexts, e.g.,
, into the corresponding ciphertexts for key k, without knowing the key. This attack is called instance deduction by Knudsen [4, 3] . Similarly, by swapping ciphertexts and plaintexts, the attack where a subset of all ciphertexts are decrypted into the corresponding plaintexts is possible.
Key Recovery
The attacker recovers the last round key as follows. We denote the output of the
can be expressed as a polynomial in {x u , x u−1 , . . . , x 1 } as follows:
Let N be the number of coefficients inf (x u , x u−1 , . . . , x 1 ). On the other hand, y j can be also expressed using the ciphertext y and the last round key k (R) . Therefore, if N pairs of plaintexts x and ciphertexts y are available, the attacker can constructf (x u , x u−1 , . . . , x 1 ) usingỹ j which is computed using y and a guessed k
If Eq. (2) holds for another plaintext/ciphertext pair, the guessed k (R) is correct with high probability. From the procedure above, the last round key is recovered from any N + 1 pairs of plaintexts and ciphertexts. The average of the required complexity for recovering the last round key is (N + 1)2 l −1 , where l is the number of last round key bits effective in Eq. (2). Repeating similar procedures, the attacker can find all round keys.
In the above, we showed only how to recover the last round key in the case of the global deduction attack, or known plaintext attack. Similarly the instance deduction attack, or chosen plaintext attack is also possible. In the instance deduction attack, the attacker can only use chosen plaintexts and ciphertexts, but fewer pairs are required than in the global deduction attack.
Meet-in-the-Middle Approach
The meet-in-the-middle approach in the interpolation attack was introduced by Jakobsen and Knudsen [3] , which is effective for some attacks on block ciphers.
We denote the output of a certain internal round by
On the other hand, z j can be also expressed as a polynomial in {ỹ u ,ỹ u−1 , . . . , y 1 } as follows:
Note thatỹ j can be computed from the ciphertext y and a guessed k (R) . Therefore, Eq. (3) is constructed by guessing k (R) .
The number of pairs required for constructing Eq. Note that we subtract 1's because we can fix one of the coefficients in the rational expression to a certain value, e.g., 1. The attacker can judge whether k (R) is correct or not by examining if Eq. (3) holds for another plaintext/ciphertext pair.
SNAKE
The cipher SNAKE is a Feistel cipher, which has two types, SNAKE(1) and SNAKE(2), with different round functions. The general form is SNAKE(i)(m, s, w, r), where i -(= 1 or 2) the type of SNAKE described in the below, m -the size of input and output of the S-box in bit, s -the number of S-boxes used in the round function, w -block size in bit (w = 2sm), r -the number of rounds. (1) and SNAKE(2) for s = 4, which were demonstrated in [5] . For the S-box in the round function, the inverse function S(x) = x −1 in GF(2 m ) is used, because differential probability and linear probability of S(x) are 2 2−m when m is even. In this paper we define the S-box as follows, though the output for input 0 is not defined in [5] .
Since SNAKE(i) (8, 4, 64, 16 ) is given as an example in [5] , we apply the interpolation attack to it in Section 4. Moreover, we also apply the interpolation attack to a 128-bit variant, SNAKE(i)(16, 4, 128, 16) in Section 5, since in [5] it is claimed that one of merits of the cipher SNAKE is that its encrypting data block length (=block size) is flexible.
Interpolation Attack of SNAKE(i)(8, 4, 64, r)

Rational Expression over GF(2 8 ) of SNAKE(i)(8, 4, 64, r)
In this section, we attack SNAKE(i) (8, 4 , 64, r) using the interpolation attack. If we represent the cipher SNAKE as a polynomial, the attack becomes impractical with only a few rounds, since the number of coefficients in the polynomial increases to the upper bound of the number of pairs we can obtain. Therefore, we represent SNAKE as a rational expression over GF (2 8 ). Let the plaintext block and the ciphertext block be as follows.
We denote the i-th round key by
Moreover, we denote the upper half (32 bits) of the output of the r-th round by
Global deduction. In the global deduction, we represent a ciphertext subblock as a rational expression over GF(2 8 ) in {x 8 , x 7 , . . . , x 1 }. First of all, we show that the round functions of SNAKE(1) and SNAKE(2) can be represented as simple rational expressions as follows:
where variables X i , Y j ∈ GF(2 8 ) are shown in Figures 1 and 2 . Next, we extend the expressions of the round function to the entire cipher. In a Feistel cipher, there are XORs between 32-bit data in each round. These operations are regarded as four additions on GF(2 8 ). We'd like to find the rational expression over GF(2 8 ) of each subblock of the output of the r-th round, z
, where f
4 , . . . , k
1 ]. We use the computer algebra system Risa/Asir [7] to compute the rational expressions. It usually takes much time and space complexity to find them since the number of variables and the degree increases as the number of rounds increases. However, it is possible to find the rational expressions of the cipher SNAKE with only a few rounds. We show the actual numbers of coefficients in the rational expressions in Table 1 . The number of coefficients we find here is very important and useful for evaluating the tighter upper bound of the complexity and the number of p/c pairs in the key-recovery attack that uses the meet-in-the-middle approach (see Section 5).
For estimating the number of coefficients in the rational expressions of SNAKE with more rounds, we use the following two techniques.
-decrease the number of variables by representing each round key k (r) j as κ i ∈ GF(2 8 ), i.e., a monomial in κ, where κ ∈ GF(2 8 ) and i is randomly chosen from GF(2 8 ) \ {0, 255}. -estimate the upper bound of the number of coefficients using Eq. (1), since it is easy to find the degree of the rational expression with respect to each variable. We show the degrees of the rational expressions over GF (2 8 ) with respect to each variable in Table 2 . Since for every subblock of every round z (r) j ∈ GF(2 8 ), the rational expressions of SNAKE(1) and SNAKE(2) are of the same degree with respect to each variable, we put them together in one table, Table 2 .
Instance deduction. In the instance deduction, we fix some subblocks of the plaintexts x = (x 8 , x 7 , . . . , x 1 ) to a certain value. For example, we fix {x 7 , . . . , x 1 } to {0, . . . , 0}, and represent a ciphertext subblock as a rational expression over GF (2 8 ) in x 8 . If the number of coefficients in this rational expression in x 8 , denoted by N , does not exceed 2 8 = 256, we can construct the rational expression using N pairs of chosen plaintexts and ciphertexts. Therefore, it is desirable to find chosen p/c pairs such that the required number of pairs is as small as possible.
Chosen plaintexts useful for attacking SNAKE (1) . We decided to find the rational expression with the fewest coefficients from the rational expressions in one variable. The reason for this is as follows. Let α and β be the numbers of variables. For the rational expression of a subblock z (r) j , if α > β, the minimum value of the number of coefficients in the rational expression in α variables is larger than that in β variables.
It is easy to compute the rational expressions in one variable for all possible chosen plaintexts, since there are only 2 8 combinations. Our experimental results show that when we choose plaintexts s.t. (x 8 , 0, . . . , 0) the number of coefficients in the rational expression in x 8 is the smallest for SNAKE (1) . Table 3 shows the degrees of the rational expressions over GF (2 8 ) when we choose plaintexts s.t. (x 8 , 0, . . . , 0) and (0, x 7 , 0, . . . , 0) , respectively. The figures in brackets are the numbers of coefficients in the numerator or denominator polynomials. From Table 3 , we can see that these rational expressions are dense, or all coefficients are nonzero. Note that the degrees with respect to x 8 and x 7 in Table 2 are not always equivalent to those in Table 3 , though you may conjecture that they are equivalent.
Chosen plaintexts useful for attacking SNAKE (2) . For SNAKE(2), if we choose plaintexts s.t. (x 8 , x 8 , 0, . . . , 0) , the degree of the rational expression in x 8 falls as Table 4 shows. This is because the input to the leftmost S-box in the 2-nd round function becomes constant. Our experimental results show that the plaintexts 1,1,2,1,2,3  0,1,1,1,1,1,2,3 , 0, 0,1,1,1,2,1,2  0,0,1,1,1,1,1,2 , z 0,0,0,1,1,1,2,1  0,0,0,1,1,1,1,1   ,   1,1,1,1,1,2,3,5  1,1,1,1,1,2 1,2,3,3,6,7,9  1,1,2,3,3,6,7,9   ,   1,2,1,2,2,3,6,7  1,1,1,2,2,3,6,7 , z 1,1,2,1,1,2,3,6  1,1,1,1,1,2,3 , z (5) 2 , z Note) Let deg x i f be the degree of f with respect to xi, and the degrees in Table 2 are shown as follows.
s.t. (x 8 , x 8 , 0, . . . , 0) bring about the rational expression in one variable of the fewest coefficients for SNAKE(2). The plaintexts s.t. (0, x 7 , x 7 , 0, . . . , 0) bring about the second fewest one.
Key Recovery
In this subsection, we demonstrate how to recover the last round key by taking a simple example of a chosen plaintext attack of SNAKE(2) with 9 rounds, i.e. SNAKE(2)(8, 4, 64, 9), (see also Figure 3 in Appendix). If we choose plaintexts s.t. x = (x 8 , x 8 , 0, . . . , 0) , the second subblock from the right of the output of the 7-th round, z
, is represented as the rational expression
f2(x8) , where both f 1 (x 8 ) and f 2 (x 8 ) have 16 coefficients (see Table 4 ). Therefore, if 16 + 15 = 31 pairs of plaintexts s.t. x = (x 8 , x 8 , 0, . . . , 0) and corresponding ciphertexts are given, we can construct the rational expression. The attack equation is as follows. (1). z (6) 4 , z (6) 3 , z (6) 2 , z 4 , z (7) 3 , z (7) 2 , z z (6) 4 , z (6) 3 , z (6) 2 , z The last round key k (9) 1 is recovered as follows. For 31 plaintext/ciphertext pairs, we compute the right side of Eq. (4) guessing k (9) 1 . Thus all the coefficients in f1(x8) f2(x8) are determined. If the constructed Eq. (4) holds for the 32-nd pair of plaintext and ciphertext, we can judge that the guessed k (9) 1 is correct with high probability. Since k (9) 1 is 8 bits, the average of the required complexity of this attack is about 32 × 2 8 × 1 2 ∼ 2 12 times the computation of an S-box. Note that the required complexity for constructing the rational expression is negligible.
We apply similar key-recovery attacks to SNAKE with several rounds. We show some best attacks in Table 5 , for which I mean that there is trade-off relations between the required number of p/c pairs and the complexity. The complexity is measured by the times of computation of the round function. In the column of strategy we show the attack strategies using simple symbols.
For example, the strategy "7i + 1k" means that the key-recovery attack uses the instance deduction of 7-round and recovers the last round key (m bits) as Figure 3 shows. The strategy "7i + 2k" means that the key-recovery attack uses the instance deduction of 7-round and recovers the last round key (4m bits) and a subblock of the key of the second round from the bottom (m bits). The strategy "11i + 2g + 1k" means that the key-recovery attack uses the meet-in-the-middle approach where the instance deduction of 11-round and the global deduction of 2-round are used, and recovers the last round key (4m bits) as Figure 4 shows. 16, 4, 128, r) We apply the interpolation attack to a 128-bit variant, SNAKE(i) (16, 4, 128, r) . When the block size is 128 bits and the size of input and output of the S-box is 16 bits, the maximum number of available p/c pairs for the attacker increases compared with the case when the block size is 64 bits. Thus, some attacks become possible that would be impractical when the block size was 64 bits.
Interpolation Attack of SNAKE(i)(
For example, we demonstrate the interpolation attack of SNAKE(2) with 15 rounds, i.e. SNAKE(2)(16, 4, 128, 15) (see also Figure 4 in Appendix). If we choose plaintexts s.t. x = (x 8 , x 8 , 0, . . . , 0) , the second subblock from the Diffusion layer. It is the plain diffusion layer that makes the interpolation attack on the cipher SNAKE(2) easier. The diffusion layer of the cipher SNAKE(2) keeps the outputs of some subblocks constant for some chosen plaintexts. We have to consider this in designing the diffusion layer.
Concluding remarks.
We presented an efficient interpolation attack using a computer algebra system. We succeeded in attacking the block cipher SNAKE efficiently -with smaller complexity and fewer p/c pairs -1) by finding the actual number of coefficients in the rational expression used in the attack and 2) by finding the rational expression with the fewest coefficients by choosing the plaintexts. We found some attacks feasible which we would consider as impossible by the interpolation attack described in [3] . When we evaluate the resistance of a block cipher to the interpolation attack, it is necessary to apply the interpolation attack described in this paper.
We showed that when the block size is 64 bits and m = 8, all round keys are recovered for SNAKE(1) and SNAKE(2) with up to 11 rounds. Moreover, when the block size is 128 bits and m = 16, all round keys are recovered for SNAKE(1) with up to 15 rounds and SNAKE(2) with up to 16 rounds.
